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Abstract: On the standard view, there are different types of presumptions but, nevertheless, they all 
asymmetrically allocate the burden of proof. In this talk, I distinguish two meanings of the “burden of proof” and 
argue that two types of presumptions, practical and cognitive ones, allocate the burden of proof in different senses. 
Consequently, the standard accounts of presumptions are either more fragmented than scholars usually admit, or 
they have lower explanatory potential. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The notion of the burden of proof plays an important role in both ordinary and academic 
parlance. Broadly understood, it denotes the dialogical obligation of a party (e.g., proponent) 
to support her position once it gets challenged, rejected, or contradicted by the opponent. In 
law, philosophy and argumentation theory, the burden of proof raises many questions, but one 
question stands out in terms of popularity and practical relevance: Which party, in the 
discussion, carries, or should carry the burden of proof? How should we, in light of that, 
structure a reasonable discussion? For instance, if both parties have standpoints, should they 
both carry the (equal) burden of proof, or should one party, in some sense, be dialectically 
privileged? I shall call this the allocation question. In this paper, I deal with the allocation 
question in those situations where it is a presumption that is challenged, rejected or 
contradicted. 
In the general case, where it is not a presumption that gets challenged, it might seem 
that there is a simple answer: in the so-called mixed discussion, where both parties have 
standpoints, we should accept a symmetrical allocation of the burden of proof (van Eemeren 
and Houtlosser 2002; Walton 2014). In argumentation theory, pragma-dialecticians have 
advocated this view, and their position coheres well with “dialectical egalitarianism.” 
According to this philosophical tradition, once parties decide to have a reasonable discussion, 
then every proposition, if challenged, must be supported by an argument (see Rescorla 2009a). 
As a result, there are neither privileged parties nor privileged standpoints: “In a mixed dispute, 
where two parties have advanced contradictory standpoints, each party has a burden of proof 
for his own standpoint” (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2002, p. 18).  
Despite their intuitiveness and elegance,1 the symmetrical allocation and dialectical 
egalitarianism are, to some extent, controversial. Many philosophers and argumentation 
scholars have argued that sometimes we should accept an asymmetrical allocation of the 
burden of proof since some propositions are dialectically privileged. Once these propositions 
 
1 One aspect of “elegance” is that the allocation question seems to get resolved almost on conceptual grounds. 
That is, if we must attribute the burden of proof to every party whose position gets challenged (rejected, 
contradicted) in the dialogue, then allocating the burden of proof comes down to nothing more than rephrasing 
the definition of the burden of proof: the answer to a question of who carries the burden of proof seems already 
contained in the meaning of the burden of proof.  
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get challenged, they do not require support until or unless the opponent presents (sufficient) 
reasons against their acceptability. According to the standard account, privileged propositions 
which shift, reverse, or asymmetrically allocate the burden of proof, and that are also defeasible 
in nature, are called presumptions (see Whately 1963; Rescher 1977, 2006; Ullmann-Margalit 
1983; Freeman 2005; Walton 2014; Godden 2017). So, if both parties have standpoints and 
their standpoints get challenged, then both parties carry the burden of proof unless one 
standpoint is a presumption. 
The standard accounts of presumption are surprisingly heterogeneous (see Godden and 
Walton 2007; Lewiński 2017) and there are at least two sources of heterogeneity. First, there 
are fundamental disagreements among scholars on how to characterize presumptions,2 and, 
second, there are fundamental differences between different types of presumptions. For 
instance, we might distinguish cognitive (epistemic) and practical presumptions since they 
operate in different dialogical contexts (epistemic inquiry vs. practical deliberation), perform 
distinct normative functions  (promoting epistemic vs. non-epistemic goals) and, thereby, have 
qualitatively different foundations (see Ullmann-Margalit 1983, p. 143; Rescher 2006, p. 27; 
Godden and Walton 2007, p. 337; Lewiński 2017, p. 610).3  
Cognitive presumptions are typically used in the context of epistemic inquiry. In a 
reasonable epistemic discussion about the shape of Earth, “The Earth is round” is a (strong) 
cognitive presumption since this proposition “represents our most plausible candidate for 
truth” (Rescher 2006, p. 71). The dialogical parties should recognize that, due to the 
overwhelming and well-known (scientific) evidence that the Earth is round, “The Earth is 
round” should be exempted from the standard burden of proof, i.e., that the burden of proof 
should rest only with its opponent. The concept of a cognitive presumption coheres well with 
“dialectical foundationalism,” a philosophical tradition which suggests that the rules of 
reasonable discussion should protect (epistemically) uncontroversial propositions and sanction 
(epistemically) deviant challenges (see Rescorla 2009a). By contrast, practical presumptions 
are typically used in the context of practical deliberation. In criminal law, for instance, “John 
is innocent” is a (strong) practical presumption: since we should “try to minimize the 
conviction of innocent persons, even at the cost of letting guilty persons go free” (Walton 1988, 
p. 244) the (global) burden of proof rests only with the prosecutor, and “John is innocent” 
stands good until or unless the prosecutor proves otherwise. Although inspired by legal 
scholarship, the concept of a practical presumption is readily applicable to many contexts of 
everyday deliberation where, in the circumstances of uncertainty and pressure to make a timely 
decision we wish to avoid more significant harm (see Ullmann-Margalit 1983; Godden 2017).  
Cognitive and practical presumptions are different in many respects,4 but one feature 
seems to hold them together. According to the standard accounts, regardless of whether p is a 
 
2 For instance, scholars disagree whether presumptions are rules (Prakken and Sartor 2006) or propositions 
(Walton 2014); statuses, modifiers, qualifiers of propositions (Godden 2017, 2019) or relations (Pinto, according 
to Freeman 2005, p. 27); based on inferential (Godden and Walton 2007) or discursive support (Freeman 2005; 
Rescher 2006); and whether they belong to the opening (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2002) or the argumentation 
stage of the critical discussion (Walton 2014). 
3 Importantly, the proposed distinction is also a matter of controversy. Some scholars believe that we should, 
indeed, distinguish practical from cognitive presumptions (e.g., Rescher 2006, Freeman 2005), and others remain 
open to this possibility (see Ullmann-Margalit 1983, p. 143; Godden and Walton 2007, p. 337). However, Godden 
(2019) has recently argued against the theoretical relevance of cognitive (epistemic) presumptions and insisted 
that “presumably” is exclusively a practical (non-epistemic) modality. Although he presents plausible concerns 
about the notion of cognitive presumption, this paper sets these concerns aside. It starts from the assumption that 
cognitive presumptions represent a legitimate class of presumptions.     
4 Not only do cognitive and practical presumptions have different ultimate contextual functions (i.e., acquiring 
truths vs. making right decisions) and different normative functions (promoting epistemic vs. non-epistemic 
values), but they also have distinct dialogical functions (i.e., practical presumptions do not stop dialectical 
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cognitive or a practical presumption, if p gets rejected, then the burden of proof rests 
exclusively with the opponent. Hence, all presumptions share the same deontic function: they 
asymmetrically allocate the burden of proof. The idea of asymmetrical allocation is a 
cornerstone of the standard account of presumptions for two reasons: first, all types of 
presumptions, supposedly, share this function (despite other differences), and, second, all 
traditional scholars seem to agree on this idea (despite other disagreements).  
In this paper, I will explore the deontic function of presumptions in some detail and 
(provisionally) answer the allocation question in so-far as presumptions are concerned. The 
main question is the following: What, exactly, does the deontic function of presumption amount 
to? Once presumptions are rejected, do they place the burden of proof on the opponents? If 
they do, what, exactly, does the burden of proof amount to; and, if they do not, what other 
obligations might be relevant? Do presumptions place the burden of arguing, the burden of 
explanation, or the more general burden of reasoning on their opponents? Minimally, the paper 
shows that the standard account of the deontic function is ambiguous. If presumptions allocate 
the “burden of proof” on the opponent, then they allocate it in two distinct senses: cognitive 
presumptions allocate a general burden of reasoning, and practical presumptions allocate a 
more specific burden of arguing on the opponent (at least in optimal scenarios). Nevertheless, 
the standard account is not only ambiguous but also implausible: since “burden of proof” is 
best understood as a burden of arguing (rather than a more general burden of reasoning) 
cognitive presumptions, strictly taken, do not asymmetrically allocate the burden of proof. As 
a result, the standard accounts require clarifications, qualifications, and, most generally, 
revisions.  
 Of course, some scholars have already claimed that the standard accounts of 
presumption, as well as dialectical foundationalism, are not plausible. For instance, Kauffeld 
(1998, 2003, 2005) and Bermejo-Luque (2019) argued that, in the context of everyday 
dialogue, presumptions are not always negatively correlated to the burden of proof, and 
dialectical egalitarians insist that a reasonable discussion should never be “dogmatic” (see 
Rescorla 2009a, p. 96). This paper adds to this trend by distinguishing between (1) various 
types of presumptions and (2) distinct meanings of “burden of proof,” and answers the more 
refined allocation questions generated by the increase in typological and conceptual detail. For 
the most part, the paper hopes to enhance the study of presumptions by adding to the analytic 
sophistication.         
I first outline common principles of asymmetrical allocation (Sect. 2), and then focus 
on the cognitive and practical presumptions (Sect. 3). In Sect. 4, I deal with the different 
meanings of the burden of proof (the burden of reasoning, and the burden of arguing) and their 
relationships to the burden of explanation. After explaining these notions, I connect them to 
cognitive and practical presumptions (Sect. 4.1—4.4). In conclusion, I provide a summary of 
the most important results. 
 
2. Common principles of asymmetrical allocation 
 
The view that, sometimes, only one dialogical party is obliged to provide reasons (of a 
particular kind and quality), although both parties have standpoints, is present in both ordinary 
and academic contexts. For instance, after complaining about potential voter fraud, Donald 
Trump tried to discredit the disagreeing journalist for failing to show that the fraud did not 
 
regress); pragmatic functions (i.e., two types of presumptions do not avoid greater harm in the similar sense); and, 
at least sometimes, they seem susceptible to different types of defeaters. For details, see Bodlović (forthcoming 
2020). 
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happen instead of providing arguments for his own claim once the journalist challenged it. 
Thus, it seems that Trump implicitly appealed to the asymmetrical allocation of the burden of 
proof (for details, see CNBC.com staff 2016).  
In academic contexts, the asymmetrical allocation is advocated more explicitly. For 
instance, it is “a piece of scientific orthodoxy” (Dare and Kingsbury 2008, p. 511) that the 
burden of proof should exclusively rest with those who propose new scientific hypotheses, 
theories, or paradigms. Philosophers have proposed asymmetrical allocation, as well. Lycan 
(2003) argues that, in a metaphysical discussion concerning the relationship between free will 
and determinism, only the proponents of incompatibilism should carry the burden of proof. 
Whereas the famous “wager argument” suggests that the burden of proof should rest with the 
atheist (Pascal 2004), Scriven (1966), and Flew (1972) claim that, in the discussion about the 
existence of God, only the theist should carry the burden of proof. In epistemology, an 
asymmetrical allocation is relevant for regulating the debate between a sceptic and a dogmatist 
(Kelly 2005), and for resolving a problem of infinite (dialectical) regress (see Rescher 1977; 
Rescorla 2009b). Also, it is present in the bioethical debates about discrimination (Räikkä 
1997), organ markets, human enhancement, climate change, and the precautionary principle 
(Koplin and Selgelid 2015). Finally, in metaphilosophy, Williamson (2011) argues that the 
burden of proof should rest with those who deny that philosophical expertise contributes to the 
successful performance of thought experiments. Therefore, the asymmetrical allocation has 
been advocated by a number of scholars, across many philosophical disciplines and within 
different intellectual traditions.  
Sometimes, the attempt to asymmetrically allocate the burden of proof is a mere 
rhetorical trick used to gain an unfair dialogical advantage (as in the Trump example). Still, 
asymmetrical allocations can also have procedural, prudential, epistemic, or even moral 
foundations. Different types of normative foundations generate different principles. In my 
view, the common normative principles of asymmetrical allocation, i.e., principles which are 
not motivated (only) by rhetorical self-interest, can be divided into two broad categories: 
proposition-related principles and agent-related principles. In what follows, I briefly explain 
several principles, as well as the proposed categorization. 
Let us focus on the popular slogan “she who asserts must prove.” Although this 
“overarching principle of burden of proof” (Walton 2014, p. 99) appears straightforward, I 
believe that it is ambiguous for (at least) two reasons. First, it is unclear whether “she who 
asserts must prove” is the principle of symmetrical or asymmetrical allocation. On the one 
hand, if we understand the principle literally and apply it to a mixed discussion, then the 
principle allocates the burden of proof symmetrically: both parties are obliged to provide 
reasons because both parties assert standpoints. On the other hand, it seems that “she who 
asserts must prove” is, at least sometimes, understood as the principle of asymmetrical 
allocation. The literature allows several (incompatible) explanations of why this might be the 
case, which, in turn, render the overarching principle even more ambiguous. As a result, not 
only is it unclear whether the overarching principle symmetrically or asymmetrically allocates 
the burden of proof but also it is unclear on what grounds, exactly, is this principle supposed 
to allocate the burden of proof asymmetrically.  
There are (at least) three interpretations of “she who asserts must prove” that would 
allow the overarching principle to allocate the burden of proof asymmetrically in a mixed 
discussion. First, the act of making an assertion is sometimes understood as the act of initiating 
an argument or “bringing the action.” Under this interpretation, the overarching principle 
would mean that (1) the burden of proof rests (only) with the dialogical party who presents the 
view first, rather than with anyone who performs the speech act of an assertion.5 Second, the 
 
5 This is connected to the legal principle: Semper necessitas probandi incumbit ei qui agit. 
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act of making an assertion is sometimes understood as the act of rejecting the status quo, i.e., 
of challenging widely accepted beliefs or values. Under this interpretation, the overarching 
principle would mean that (2) the burden of proof rests (only) with the party who asserts 
something (dialectically, epistemically, instrumentally) controversial (see Räikkä 1997, pp. 
466-467).6 Third, it seems that “asserting” is sometimes understood as “affirming.” Under this 
interpretation, the overarching principle would mean that (3) the burden of proof rests (only) 
with the party who asserts a positive claim (Cargile 1997, p. 61).7 For the most part, the 
previous interpretations are all concerned with the question: How should we allocate the burden 
of proof given what we know about the normatively relevant properties of the standpoints or 
claims (i.e., is the claim presented first, is it controversial, and is it an affirmation or a 
negation)? As a result, three interpretations of the overarching principle represent proposition-
based principles of asymmetrical allocation.   
The second group of principles is concerned with a different question, namely: How 
should we allocate the burden of proof (in order to facilitate the optimal resolution of the 
dispute) given what we know about the dialectically relevant abilities or inclinations of 
dialogical parties? Consider the case where David says to Luke: “Well, I paid the last round of 
drinks; so, it is your turn!” Since it is Luke who paid the last round, he disagrees with David, 
and the discussion begins. But suppose that Luke has a receipt in his pocket. In this case, 
although David initiates the conversation and advances a controversial claim,8 the resolution 
procedure will be more effective if Luke incurs the burden of proof. Luke has access to decisive 
evidence, and should he be obliged to present it, the issue would be quickly resolved. The 
principle, therefore, is the following: (4) the burden of proof rests (only) with the party who 
has better epistemic access to evidence.9  
Finally, suppose that David wants to buy a car from Luke. In this case, it is crucial to 
determine whether the vehicle is in good condition, and Luke, as a longtime owner, surely has 
better access to evidence. However, since Luke’s motivation to speak truthfully might be 
compromised, it is useful to attribute the burden of proof to David, who has a genuine interest 
in discovering the truth. If the primary goal is to acquire true belief about the car’s condition, 
then asymmetrical allocation might, once again, facilitate the optimal resolution of the issue 
(see Dare and Kingsbury 2008).10 Hence, the underlying principle is the following: (5) the 
 
6 Since somebody can initiate a discussion without asserting a highly controversial claim, these principles do not 
go hand in hand. 
7 The principle “Affirmati non neganti incumbit probatio” is based on the idea that it is not dialectically reasonable 
to allocate the burden of proof on the proponent of the negative claim because it is rather demanding to prove the 
absence of property, fact or incident. The usual explanation, however, is even stronger because it suggests that it 
is impossible to prove a negative claim: “You cannot prove a negative.” This slogan is typically applied in the 
discussions about the existence of paranormal or supernatural entities (such as God) and is “combined with the 
thought that people should not be assigned obligations to do impossible things” (Cargile 1997, p. 61). 
Nevertheless, scholars have argued that, in the usual circumstances, it is possible to prove a negative claim (see, 
e.g., Cargile 1997; Macagno & Walton 2011; Pigliucci and Boudry 2014) and that even if proving a negative 
claim is somewhat more demanding, it should affect the allocation of the burden of proof. For instance, according 
to the “priority principle,” it should change the order of defense: both parties should carry the burden of proof, 
but the proponent of the positive claim should go first (see van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2002). 
8 Suppose, for instance, that all other friends saw who paid the drinks.  
9 In civil law, this is known as the “principle of fairness” (van Eemeren et al. 2002, p. 115) and it is usually applied 
in the cases of product liability (Hahn and Oaksford 2007, p. 41). 
10 This is linked to the legal principle caveat emptor (Dare and Kingsbury 2008). The proposed list is not 
exhaustive. For instance, Hansen (2019) mentions two additional principles: the burden of proof “belongs to the 
party who would lose the case if the outcome had to be decided at this point,” and “it belongs where the law says 
it belongs” (pp. 15-16). In addition, we can refine the studies of asymmetrical allocation by taking into account 
the pragmatic dimensions of propositions. In other words, we should not focus only on the party who introduces 
the proposition (e.g., is it the party who ‘brings the action,’ or with ‘pure motivation’?) and the nature of 
proposition (e.g., is it a negative one, or controversial one?), but also on the (intended) pragmatic goal that 
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burden of proof rests (only) with the party who is less biased, or who does not have corrupted 
motivation. Notice that the last two principles are not concerned with the properties of 
propositions but rather with distinctive abilities or inclinations of dialogical parties. (i.e., the 
ability to provide sufficient proof, and the inclination towards truth). As a result, they represent 
agent-based principles of asymmetrical allocation.   
In the following sections, I will mostly focus on the second proposition-based principle 
mentioned above. According to this principle, some propositions do not require support 
because, in some contexts and circumstances, they seem epistemically plausible or 
instrumentally desirable. Typically, these propositions are called cognitive and practical 
presumptions. Although one may propose that all aforementioned principles “explicitly or 
implicitly determine, at least partly, what it is reasonable or justified to presume” (Räikkä 1997 
p. 463), the analysis in this paper will start from a narrower concept of presumption.  
 
3 Cognitive and practical presumptions 
 
Suppose that Diane and Steve are discussing the shape of the Earth. Diane admits that scientific 
claims are defeasible, but believes that science offers the best available answers about the 
natural world. In this specific epistemic dialogue, Diane claims that the Earth is round (or 
spherical), and readily accepts this belief as her standpoint. By contrast, Steve is a member of 
the Flat Earth Society, who believes that the overwhelming scientific evidence is a fabrication. 
He thinks that the Earth is disc-shaped, and accepts this belief as his standpoint. 
 In the ordinary context, “The Earth is round” is a (strong) cognitive presumption. Since 
this empirical claim is, in principle, defeasible, it might be reasonable to discuss it and, in 
exceptional circumstances, even reject it.11 In the normal cases, however, any reasonable 
person (with primary education) should acknowledge that, in Rescher’s words, “The Earth is 
round” is “our most plausible candidate for truth” (2006, p. 71). Many reliable epistemic 
sources vouch for it,12 and this fact requires dialectical recognition: in epistemic dialogue, the 
proponent of a plausible standpoint and the proponent of an implausible standpoint should not 
play by the same rules. Granted, the dialectical rules should not require an immediate 
acceptance of the most plausible standpoint, but, also, they should not force us to proceed as 
if, initially, all propositions are equally plausible. Epistemic dialogues must avoid both 
uncritical dogmatism and naïve egalitarianism: on the one hand, its rules must allow the 
criticism of plausible standpoints (since this is a desirable epistemic attitude), but, on the other 
hand, give some dialectical credit to (highly) plausible standpoints (since, initially, they seem 
epistemically warranted).  
If we must regulate epistemic dialogues by dialectical rules that systematically further 
epistemic ends, then the asymmetrical allocation of the burden of proof seems like a proper 
regulatory choice. In the Flat Earth example, the acceptance of “The Earth is round” appears 
to facilitate the acquisition of true or justified beliefs, so Diane should not carry the burden of 
proof. By contrast, initially, the acceptance of “The Earth is disc-shaped” appears to get in the 
 
underlies the proposition. Along these lines, Kauffeld suggests that the allocation of the burden of proof depends 
(1) on the type of speech act. Thus, p will entail the burden of proof if used as a proposal, but not if used as a 
suggestion (Kauffeld 1998). Pragma-dialecticians also recognize the importance of pragmatic properties. In their 
opinion, however, what determines the allocation is, strictly speaking, not the nature of the particular speech act, 
but (2) the argumentative function of this speech act in a critical discussion (Tseronis 2009, p. 83). Thus, some 
suggestion p will entail the burden of proof if it represents a (sub)standpoint, but not if it represents a starting 
point agreed upon at the opening stage.        
11 “The Earth is round” is defeasible in the sense that it not with mathematical certainty that the proposition is 
true, and it is conceptually possible that some day we obtain information that would show it to be false. So, it is 
not, in principle, irrational either to have a discussion about it or to reject it. 
12 For instance, scientific authority, evidence, testimonies, and explanatory utility. 
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way of achieving epistemic goals, and, for this reason, Steve should carry the burden of proof.13 
This means that Steve should show that circumstances are somehow exceptional, and present 
(persuasive) arguments that the Earth is disc-shaped.14 If his arguments, ultimately, do not 
survive Diane’s critical testing, “The Earth is round” gets accepted by default.15 So, initially, 
an asymmetrical allocation favors the more plausible propositions and sanctions deviant 
challenges, but it still allows the criticism of credible claims and offers a normative 
infrastructure for having a debate about widely-accepted views that happen to be controverted 
by eccentric individuals. 
To sum up, if p is the most plausible truth-candidate, then p is a dialogically privileged 
proposition and represents a cognitive presumption. So, the status of cognitive presumption is 
both an epistemic status, as well as a dialogical status of a proposition.      
Next, suppose that Mark and Alice are discussing whether to attend their friend’s house 
party. They are invited and would, generally, like to go, but their decision (mostly) depends on 
whether John will be at the party. John is a person who Mark and Alice intensely dislike, and 
they agree that his presence will necessarily ruin their evening.16 Since the chance that John 
will be at the party is, roughly, a half, Mark and Alice are facing the so-called “deliberation 
problem” (Ullmann-Margalit 1983; Godden 2017): since the party is about to begin, they must 
make their decision quickly; but since John’s whereabouts are uncertain, they cannot base their 
decision on a justified belief. Let us suppose that, in the described circumstances, Mark decides 
to proceed as if John will be at the party, and makes the following proposal: “We should skip 
the party.” Alice, however, replies: “We should go to the party.” 
In the Party example, “John will be at the party” is a practical presumption. Scholars 
typically characterize practical presumptions as propositions that we proceed upon (or take as 
if they are true) when there is pressure to make a timely decision and the evidence is uncertain 
(Ullmann-Margalit 1983; Walton 2014; Godden 2017). In these special circumstances, the 
main goal is to make a decision that avoids more significant harm. Accordingly, “John will be 
at the party” is a practical presumption because (1) there is a pressure to decide whether to go 
on the party; (2) this decision depends on whether John will be at the party; (3) it is uncertain 
whether John will be at the party; but (4) parties agree that proceeding on “John will be at the 
party” and skipping it (when, in fact, John will not be there) seems like a “lesser evil” than 
proceeding on “John will not be at the party” and attending it (when, in fact, John will be 
 
13 Not only is this view supposed to cohere with some pre-theoretical intuitions (see Rescorla 2009a), but it also 
seeks to resolve a well-known theoretical problem of an infinite (dialectical) regress (see Rescher 1977; Freeman 
2005; Rescorla 2009b). 
14 It is crucial to notice that Steve is obliged to present (persuasive) arguments that the Earth is disc-shaped in 
order to win the discussion, but not in order to defeat the presumptive status of “The Earth is round.” The 
presumptive status of Diane’s standpoint gets defeated as soon as Diane incurs the standard burden of proof, i.e., 
becomes obliged to argue that the Earth is round. In principle, Steve can make this happen by successfully 
undercutting well-known scientific evidence and, thereby, showing that “The Earth is flat” and “The Earth is 
round” are equally plausible propositions. In this case, “The Earth is round” ceases to be the most plausible truth-
candidate and, hence, loses its presumptive status, but Steve does not win the discussion by defeating a 
presumptive status in the described fashion. Instead, he only resets the debate: from that point on, Diane also 
incurs the burden of proof, and the dialogue continues in a new normative setting. 
15 This dialectical bias towards a scientific status quo is generally relevant for regulating a debate between 
scientists and pseudoscientists. According to Pigliucci and Boudry (2014), since pseudoscientific claims 
(concerning, e.g., Intelligent Design, extraterrestrial visits, anti-vaccination, or the denial of an anthropogenic 
climate change) have low prior probabilities, their proponents should carry the burden of proof. 
16 For the sake of example, imagine that Mark and Alice have very objective reasons to hate John, and that, due 
to these reasons, John is definitely the last person they would like to see, let alone to party with. For instance, just 
some months ago John has seriously injured their daughter in a car accident while driving drunk. After the 
incident, he denied any responsibility for his wrongdoing, and has never apologized.  
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there).17 Since proceeding on “John will be at the party” seems more desirable in the described 
circumstances, and both Mark and Alice agree that it is more desirable, the distribution of 
dialectical obligations should not be (completely) symmetrical. 
In a deliberation dialogue, the asymmetrical allocation of a burden of proof is a 
reasonable regulatory choice when we wish to promote the goal of avoiding greater harm. Since 
proceeding on “John will be at the party” promotes this goal in the Party case, Mark should not 
carry the burden of proof: in the circumstances of pressure and uncertainty, his position should 
have a status of a dialogically privileged presumption. By contrast, proceeding on “John will 
not be at the party” potentially gets in the way of avoiding greater harm and, for this reason, 
Alice should carry the burden of proof. This means that Alice should provide arguments against 
presumption, and if her arguments, ultimately, cannot persuade Mark to go to the party,18 “We 
should skip the party” gets accepted by default. Dialogical parties should not carry equal 
dialogical obligations since, in the described circumstances, their practical standpoints are not 
equally desirable. 
In summary, if proceeding on p is the most desirable practical alternative, then p is a 
dialogically privileged proposition and represents a practical presumption. So, the status of a 
practical presumption is both a practical status, as well as a dialogical status of a proposition.19 
In the next section, I explore the dialogical status by carefully examining the deontic functions 
of cognitive and practical presumptions.  
 
4. Presumptions and different conceptions of the burden of proof 
 
The view that presumption is “closely connected to the burden of proof” (Walton 2014, p. 117) 
lies at the heart of every standard account of presumption. According to Rescher, presumption 
and burden of proof “represent correlative conceptions” (2006, p. 14) and are “opposite sides 
of the same coin” (2006, p. 14). Freeman agrees with this interpretation. In his opinion, “the 
opposite of burden of proof is presumption” (2005, p. ix). What does this mean in the context 
of discussion where two sides (proponent and opponent) take turns? Here are a few illustrations 
of how presumptions are supposed to allocate dialogical obligations. 
 
[A] ‘Presumption’ in favour of any supposition … implies that it must stand good till 
some sufficient reason is adduced against it; in short, that the Burden of proof lies on 
the side of him who would dispute it.” (Whately 1963, p. 112). 
 
[W]here a proposition has the status of a presumption, then the burden of proof lies 
with anyone who refuses to concede it. (Pinto 2001, p. 4). 
 
[P]resumption is defined as a modal status (or property) of a claim (or proposition) 
indicating that the burden of proof with respect to that claim rests with anyone who 
would reject it. (Godden & Walton 2007, p. 315) 
 
 
17 Notice that this everyday example is closely similar to the legal “presumption of innocence.” Here, “John is 
innocent” has a status of practical presumption since (1) there is a legal pressure to decide whether to convict 
John; (2) this decision depends on whether John is innocent or guilty; (3) it is evidentially uncertain whether John 
is innocent or guilty; but (4) acting as if John is innocent and letting him free (when, in fact, John is guilty) is 
treated as a “lesser evil” than acting as if John is guilty and convicting him (when, in fact, John is innocent). 
18 For instance, she must prove that it is more likely that John will skip the party by using dialectically adequate 
reasons, i.e., reasons that Mark is expected to accept. 
19 For a detailed characterization of practical presumptions, see Ullmann-Margalit (1983), Godden (2017), and 
Bodlović (2020, forthcoming).  
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The presumption shifts a burden [of proof] to the other side to disprove it, or the 
proposition becomes lodged into place as a commitment of both sides. (Walton 2014, 
p. 117) 
 
[T]he presumption opponent is charged with something: with the burden of showing 
that not-q. (Ullmann-Margalit 1983, p. 151) 
 
Setting subtle differences aside,20 standard accounts appear to accept the following idea: If the 
proponent P puts forward p (that in the context at hand has the status of a presumption) in turn 
t1, and the opponent O rejects or challenges p in turn t2, then P does not carry the burden of 
proof in t3 whereas O incurs the burden of proof in t2+n. I shall call this an asymmetrical 
allocation of the burden of proof.  
But does the opponent O already have the burden of proof from turn t3? Or does O incur 
it only from turn t4 after the proponent P performs a special kind of speech act in t3, and 
activates this burden? In other words, does turn t2+n amount to t3 or t4? 
 
t1 P: Presumably, p. 
t2 O: Reject: “Presumably, p.” 
t3 ? ? 
t4 ? ? 
 
If O incurs the burden of proof in t3, then the allocation of the burden of proof is unconditional 
and immediate. In this case, O incurs the burden of proof in t3 by rejecting the presumption p 
in t2, and her obligation to provide reasons does not depend on any P’s move other than the 
move of putting forward p in t1. By contrast, if O incurs the burden of proof in t4, then O’s 
obligation to provide reasons might be conditional on P’s move in t3; for instance, on whether 
P requests reasons from O in t3. According to the citations above, standard accounts seem to 
suggest the former view. I call it an unconditional allocation of the burden of proof. Bearing 
the previous considerations in mind, I propose the following specification of the deontic 
function of presumption.  
 
THE STANDARD DEONTIC FUNCTION OF PRESUMPTION: Presumptions allocate the burden 
of proof in an unconditional and asymmetrical manner.  
 
To fully understand the standard deontic function of presumption, we should understand the 
meanings of four complicated notions: (1) allocation, (2) burden of proof, (3) (un)conditional 
allocation, and (4) (a)symmetrical allocation. In this paper, I mostly focus on the conceptual 
analysis of the “burden of proof” in the context of the theory of presumptions. This is a 
surprisingly demanding task. Namely, although we use the term “burden of proof” casually in 
ordinary parlance, it is quite complicated to determine its precise meaning. In legal scholarship, 
for instance, Thayer maintains that the burden of proof is an ambiguous notion that needs to be 
thoroughly explored and discriminated (2019, p. 75), and McCormick describes it as “the 
slipperiest member of the family of legal terms” (Strong 1992, p. 449). Unsurprisingly, as “the 
most successful jurisprudential ‘export’” (Hahn and Oaksford 2007, p. 40), the term retains its 
complexity in philosophy and argumentation theory.  
 
20 For instance, that every presumption “implies” (Whately) or “indicates” (Godden and Walton) that the opponent 
who rejects it carries the burden of proof does not necessarily mean that every presumption “shifts” (Walton) the 
burden of proof. 
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In the following (sub)sections, I offer two interpretations of the “burden of proof” and 
analyse whether cognitive and practical presumptions, under these different interpretations, 
place the burden of proof on the opponents.  
 
4.1 Presumptions, and the burden of reasoning (BoR) 
 
Let us begin with the underlying core idea that everyone accepts. According to a “first 
approximation, having a burden of proof is being under an obligation … to support one’s view” 
(Aijaz et al. 2013, p. 260) or “position” (Dare and Kingsbury 2008, p. 503; Aijaz et al. 2013, 
p. 262). Since the burden of proof presupposes a context of dialogue (Rescher 2006, p. 19) and, 
in dialogical contexts, to support means to provide reasons, one may interpret the burden of 
proof in such a way as that it says no more than that there is an obligation to provide reasons, 
of whatever kind.21 Accordingly, the most general interpretation of the burden of proof,” I label 
the burden of reasoning (BoR): 
 
THE BURDEN OF REASONING (BoR) is the party’s dialogical obligation to provide any 
reason for a position (view).  
 
How does BoR affect the interpretation of the deontic function of presumption? Well, 
it suggests that, after rejecting presumption, the opponent is obliged to provide a reason for her 
position (i.e., for “Reject: ‘Presumably, p’”). Two important points must be made here. First, 
this result is consistent with the usual characterizations of the deontic function since no 
standard account will deny that, after rejecting a presumption, the opponent must provide 
reasons. Second, this interpretation of the deontic function preserves the deontic analogy 
between cognitive and practical presumptions. That is, regardless of whether the proposition is 
epistemically plausible (“Presumably, the Earth is round”) or, in particular circumstances, 
desirable to act upon for non-epistemic reasons (“Presumably, John will be at the party”), the 
opponent must provide reasons after rejecting a presumption.  
 
t1 P: Presumably, p. 
t2 O: Reject: “Presumably, p.” 
t2+n O: Reason: r. [= discharging the BoR] 
 
If the BoR expresses the core idea which underlies the burden of proof, is consistent 
with the standard characterization of deontic function, and preserves the similarity between 
two types of presumption,22 why shouldn’t we conclude the analysis of deontic function at this 
point? Why shouldn’t we define the burden of proof in terms of BoR? The answer is twofold. 
First, since a more informative conception of the burden of proof opens essential theoretical 
questions and reveals differences between cognitive and practical presumptions, it is more 
analytically useful. Second, philosophers and argumentation scholars (traditional theorists of 
presumptions included) typically adopt a more specific conception of the burden of proof. 
What, exactly, do they mean by this conception?  
 
4.2 Presumptions, and the burden of arguing (BoA) 
 
21 Though the core idea is uncontroversial, to interpret the burden of proof as requiring nothing more specific than 
reasons happens to be controversial, as we shall see below. So, that everybody accepts the core idea does not 
mean that everybody finds it accurate. Instead, it means that accepting the core idea is necessary for accepting 
any other, accurate, more specific interpretation of burden of proof. In other words, the more precise 
interpretations imply or presuppose this broader, core characterization.  
22 Contributing, thereby, to the overall coherency of standard accounts. 
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Let us focus on the obligation to “provide a reason.” This general dialectical obligation includes 
distinct sub-obligations, most notably the obligation to provide an argument, and the 
commitment to provide an explanation. Philosophers and argumentation scholars, however, 
typically contend that “[t]o have the burden of proof is to be rationally required to argue for or 
provide evidence for your position” (Dare and Kingsbury 2008, p. 503). In other words, the 
burden of proof is an obligation of an “arguer” (Johnson 2000, p. 194) to “argue” (van Eemeren 
and Houtlosser 2002, pp. 17) or present “arguments” (Walton 1988, p. 234; Freeman 2005, p. 
ix; Govier 2010, p. 175; van Laar and Krabbe 2013, p. 202). According to this interpretation, 
the burden of proof is not only the burden of reasoning but also, more accurately, the burden 
of arguing (BoA). 
 
THE BURDEN OF ARGUING (BoA) is the party’s dialogical obligation to provide an 
argumentative reason for a position (view).  
 
To understand the nature of BoA, we must know that the paradigmatic goal of arguing is to 
persuade the other party (Walton 1990; Blair 2012) or to resolve the initial difference of opinion 
(van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004). To achieve this goal, an arguer should offer reasons 
that the other party, ideally, has already conceded (van Laar and Krabbe 2013, p. 212) or will 
most likely concede.23 I call these reasons argumentative reasons. In effect, the burden of 
arguing is an obligation to provide reasons acceptable to the other party (typically) for the sake 
of persuading her. 
What does this mean for the deontic function of presumptions? Are presumptions 
supposed to place the burden of arguing on the opponent’s side? According to standard 
accounts, they are. Traditional theorists contend that the opponent must “disprove the 
proposition in question” (Walton 2014, p. 274), adduce “sufficient reason … against it” 
(Whatley 1963, p. 112), or “[show] that not-q” (Ullmann-Margalit 1983, p. 151). In dialogical 
contexts, however, the opponent can hardly achieve these goals by merely offering an 
explanation. Rather, to disprove, defeat, or rebut a (presumed) proposition, the opponent must 
present “an argument against it” (Pinto 2001, p. 4) or, in Rescher’s words, adduce 
“appropriately weighty counterarguments” (2006, p. 16). Cognitive and practical presumptions 
are supposed to be the same in this respect: according to standard accounts, the opponent is 
obliged to provide an argument regardless of whether she rejects “Presumably, the Earth is 
round” or “Presumably, John will be at the party.”  
 
t1 P: Presumably, p. 
t2 O: Reject: “Presumably, p.” 
t2+n O: Argumentative reason: a. [=discharging the BoA.] 
 
To understand why standard accounts require revisions, let us start by analysing the 
deontic function of cognitive presumptions. Is the opponent indeed obliged to present an 
argument after rejecting cognitive presumption? In the context of an epistemic dialogue, it 
seems rather doubtful that the opponent must immediately aim at persuasion and present a 
reason that is acceptable to the proponent. In the Flat Earth example, Steve might (also) be 
allowed to offer an explanation after rejecting Diane’s standpoint “Presumably, the Earth is 
round,” i.e., he might be allowed to discharge the burden of reasoning (also) by satisfying the 
 
23 Scholars refer to this requirement by using different notions, such as “premise acceptability” (Johnson 2000, p. 
194; Govier 2010, p. 87), or “premise adequacy” (Goodwin 2001, p. 2). 
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burden of explanation (Rescorla 2009a; van Laar and Krabbe 2013). Why is this so? And what, 
exactly, is the burden of explanation? 
 
4.3 Cognitive presumptions, and the burden of explanation (BoE) 
 
To answer these questions, let us start from an undeniable fact: since Diane and Steve decided 
to participate in a discussion about the shape of Earth, both should have some argumentative 
obligations. For instance, Diane has the burden of arguing throughout a debate because she 
must make objections and cast doubt on Steve’s standpoint and arguments.24 However, since 
Diane can (successfully) discharge this burden only by presenting reasons acceptable to her 
opponent, Steve’s rejection of “Presumably, the Earth is round” puts her in an awkward 
position. Which reasons can she possibly use? If Steve rejects a proposition that, in normal 
circumstances, everyone in a right mind concedes, if the well-known and overwhelming 
evidence is insufficient to persuade him that the Earth is round, then what kind of reason can 
convince Steve of anything regarding this matter? Steve has shaken the very foundations of 
reasonable dialogue without providing any guidance on what grounds to continue. Without this 
kind of guidance, Diane will probably be unable to construct a persuasive argument.  
In the Flat Earth example, Diane is facing a complex problem. On the one hand, she 
cannot use many plausible, well-known, and widely-accepted reasons since they are 
dialectically inadequate (Steve implicitly rejects them by rejecting “The Earth is round”). On 
the other hand, Diane cannot easily anticipate which reasons are dialectically adequate: since 
Steve refuses usual, typical reasons, she can do nothing but guess what reasons might persuade 
him. The burden of explanation seeks to resolve the latter, transparency issue. Steve should 
“elucidate [his] position, thereby helping the original speaker isolate the relevant mutually 
acceptable premises” (Rescorla 2009a, p. 100)25or, in van Laar and Krabbe’s (2013) words, 
Steve should explain the “motivation for [his] position” (p. 213) in order to provide “a strategic 
advice” (p. 212) or “strategic guidance” (p. 213). This strategic advice should give Diane a 
chance to make a persuasive argument.  
The considerations connected to the burden of explanation are different from ones 
related to the burden of arguing.26 Namely, providing an explanation “is not an attempt to 
convince the other and need not start from propositions conceded by the other” (van Laar and 
Krabbe 2013, p. 212). Thus, the burden of explanation does not require argumentative, but 
explanatory reasons. 
 
 
24 It is not correct to say that (cognitive) presumption p exempts the proponent from any burden of arguing 
throughout the whole discussion. In my opinion, as far as the proponent is concerned, the presumption does two 
things. First, immediately after the opponent rejects p, it exempts the proponent from any burden of arguing. 
Second, in the discussion that follows, the presumption exempts the proponent from a burden of arguing in favor 
of p (despite the fact that p is the proponent’s standpoint), but it does not exempt her from presenting arguments 
and objections against the opponent’s views. In other words, presumptions work in the proponent’s favor by 
allowing her to win the mixed discussion by being a successful critic. 
25 Although Rescorla (2009a) seems to connect explanations to “rebuilding” the common ground, I believe that 
the purpose of explanation is more general. That is, even if explanations are legitimate only (or primarily) when 
common ground is at stake, the purpose of explaining might be to provide any premises that the proponent might 
use to make a persuasive argument. Sometimes, these premises can be acceptable only to the opponent and, thus, 
cannot represent new common ground. However, the proponent can still make use of them to make a persuasive 
case.   
26 When Steve attempts to persuade Diane that rejecting “Presumably, the Earth is round” is acceptable, he must 
use reasons that Diane considers acceptable. Steve might, for instance, say: “We should not trust everything that 
science says! Scientists have been wrong, you know.” This argument will hardly persuade Diane, but Steve does 
make a genuine effort to present the premise that Diane should accept. 
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THE BURDEN OF EXPLANATION (BoE) is the party’s dialogical obligation to provide an 
explanatory reason for a position (view).  
 
After rejecting “Presumably, the Earth is round,” Steve can offer the following explanation: 
“Our government fabricated the evidence that the Earth is round.” This explanatory reason is 
neither persuasive nor conceded by Diane, but it is helpful in resolving the aforementioned 
transparency issue: it will show Diane what to attack, as well as how to attack Steve’s position 
adequately.27 
 
t1 P: Presumably, p. 
t2 O: Reject: “Presumably, p.” 
t2+n O: Explanatory reason: e. [= discharging the BoE] 
 
Notice, for instance, that the previous explanation makes Steve committed to a more general 
claim, namely, “Governments fabricate evidence about the shape of Earth.” After realizing this, 
Diane might exploit Steve’s commitment as a premise of her (adequate) counterargument. 
Imagine that she decides to construct an alternative conspiracy theory, and says: “But our 
government could have fabricated the Flat Earth theory just to keep the public away from the 
important stuff. The Flat Earth movement had the best media coverage on the day when our 
government passed the controversial law on public health. Don’t you find this suspicious?” To 
be sure, Diane’s counterargument does not show that the Earth is round, but it might show that 
“The Earth is round” and “The Earth is disc-shaped” must be equally acceptable to Steve given 
his commitment set or, in particular, his commitment that governments fabricate evidence. 
Since Diane has a presumption in her favour, this is all she needs to do to (successfully) 
discharge her burden of arguing and to prevent Steve from winning a discussion. 
In the Flat Earth example, Steve’s explanation, however bizarre, plays a constructive 
dialectical role because it helps Diane to participate in a discussion fruitfully. Also, it nicely 
coheres with the widely-accepted, “Gricean” view that argumentative discussion is, at least in 
part, a cooperative enterprise. For these two reasons, at least, explaining seems like a 
reasonable dialectical choice. But if explaining is dialectically reasonable, then how can Steve 
be obliged to give an argument, as standard accounts of deontic function suggest? If he is 
allowed to discharge the burden of explanation, how can he carry the burden of arguing (proof)? 
Do cognitive presumptions, ultimately, asymmetrically allocate the burden of arguing (BoA) 
or the burden of explanation (BoE)? 
I believe that cognitive presumptions allocate neither of these burdens. Technically, 
once the opponent rejects a cognitive presumption, he is not immediately obliged to give an 
argument (in order to defend her position), and he is not immediately obliged to give an 
explanation (in order to provide strategic guidance). Since giving an argument and giving an 
explanation are both reasonable moves, I believe that the opponent’s obligation is rather a 
disjunction: once he rejects a cognitive presumption, he is obliged either to give an argument 
or to explain the rejection. Put differently, the opponent incurs the burden of reasoning (BoR), 
and he can discharge this burden in a more competitive (by discharging the BoA) or a more 
cooperative fashion (by discharging the BoE).28  
 
27 After Steve’s explanation, Diane knows that to cast doubt on “The Earth is disc-shaped” she must, at some 
point, make a persuasive case that “The Earth is round” might not be a government’s fabrication. More 
importantly, she can also use Steve’s explanation to derive adequate reasons for her arguments. 
28 Thus, in principle, presenting an argument is the opponent’s right rather than an obligation: since explaining is 
allowed, arguing is not required. Of course, the opponent might become obliged to argue in turn t4 if the proponent 
demands argument in turn t3, but this would imply that the opponent’s burden of arguing (proof) is conditional 
upon some move made by the proponent (other than putting forward a presumption in turn t1). However, it is not 
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t1 P:    Presumably, p. 
t2 O:    Reject: “Presumably, p.” 
 
 
 
t2+n O: Argumentative reason: a.    O: Explanatory reason: e.  
[=discharging the BoA.]     [= discharging the BoE] 
 
 
Fig. 1 A profile of dialogue: cognitive presumption 
 
As a result, the standard accounts of the deontic function of presumptions do not seem 
plausible: (cognitive) presumptions asymmetrically allocate the burden of proof only if we 
understand the burden of proof in terms of BoR. But the notion of burden of proof is more 
naturally understood in terms of BoA, and as soon as we accept the usual, more specific and 
natural interpretation of burden of proof, cognitive presumptions do not place the burden of 
proof on their opponents (since BoR does not necessarily entail BoA).  
What are the implications of this conclusion for the relationship between cognitive and 
practical presumptions? Are the opponents allowed to choose and offer explanations or 
arguments after rejecting practical presumptions, or do practical presumptions, unlike cognitive 
ones, asymmetrically allocate the burden of proof (in the strict sense of the BoA)? 
 
4.4 Practical presumptions, and the burden of explanation (BoE) 
 
I believe that practical and cognitive presumptions have distinct deontic functions. The 
differences, however, are subtle. To make that clear, I need to distinguish between two views 
on when one could impose the burden of explanation on the challenger of a practical 
presumption. I call them a stricter view and a looser view.  
According to a stricter view, a burden of explanation should only suffice when someone 
challenges a “common ground” proposition. Since the rejection of a widely-accepted (or 
mutually-accepted) proposition “counts as a substantial change of the nature of the dialogue” 
(van Laar and Krabbe 2013, p. 210), the opponent must make sure that the new conditions of 
making a persuasive argument are transparent to the proponent. Nevertheless, none of these 
considerations directly apply to practical presumptions since, in the standard view, practical 
presumptions are not common ground propositions. Instead, they are “new intellectual 
resources” used at some later stage of deliberation to “proceed with our undertakings” (Godden 
2017, p. 487). Accordingly, the opponent does not change the nature of the dialogue by 
rejecting a practical presumption, and the proponent’s task of finding dialectically adequate 
reasons should not be especially demanding. Let us illustrate this on the Party example.  
 
Alice: I would like to go to the party tonight.  
Mark: I would like to go, too. But if it is uncertain whether John will be there, I would  
rather stay at home. His presence might entirely ruin our evening.  
Alice: I agree. As long as there is a reasonable chance that John will come to the party, we  
 
clear that standard accounts of deontic function propose the conditional allocation of the burden of proof (as 
briefly mentioned at the beginning of Sect. 4). So, as long as the burden of arguing (proof) is supposed to be 
unconditionally placed on the opponent in turn t3, I believe that the standard accounts are wrong: if some 
dialectical obligation gets unconditionally allocated on the opponent (after she rejects a cognitive presumption in 
t3), then this is the burden of reasoning rather than the burden of arguing (proof).        
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should err on the side of safety and skip it. It is not worth the risk. 
Mark:  Can we somehow check whether he attends the party?  
Alice:  I asked some colleagues, but they never texted me back. Anyway, we should decide  
quickly. The train is about to leave. 
Mark:  Isn’t John out of town right now? He was bragging about his upcoming trip to Spain, 
remember? 
Alice:  Yes, but he must be at work day after tomorrow, so…  
t1 Mark: If he is back in town, he will probably be at that party. Since we are uncertain about  
his whereabouts, let’s just skip the party this time. [= “Presumably, John will be at the  
party.”] 
t2 Alice: I think we should go. 
 
By rejecting “Presumably, John will be at the party” in turn t2, Alice makes a surprising move. 
Although she, technically, does not challenge a common ground proposition,29 she rejects a 
position that follows from her commitments.30 So, Alice should provide a reason for her 
rejection, but is she allowed to offer an explanatory reason? Does it suffice to discharge the 
burden of explanation?  
If only attacks of common ground propositions incur a burden of explanation, then it 
does not suffice to impose on the opponent the mere burden to explain her position. Namely, 
the purpose of explaining is to offer strategic guidance, but, when a practical presumption gets 
challenged, the proponent does not seem to need any advice. Even before Alice gives any 
reason in t2+n, Mark, in principle, has a pretty clear idea of what might persuade her to skip the 
party. Starting from the belief that Alice still wants to avoid John, Mark can use any reason 
which proves that John will definitely (or most probably) come to the party. He can, perhaps, 
call John and tell Alice the bad news, or provide evidence that John is already in town. Of 
course, Mark might be unable to give an adequate, persuasive argument at this point, but this 
is an entirely different matter. What is crucial is that he has a good idea of what, in principle, 
might constitute an adequate, persuasive argument and that, consequently, he does not 
desperately need strategic advice. Since this need underlies the burden of explanation, 
explaining becomes irrelevant and, therefore, does not suffice in the Party example. 
In the stricter view, when a practical presumption gets rejected, explaining represents a 
means without an end: it is designed to resolve a dialectical problem that, in this context, does 
not arise. For this reason, the opponent should not be allowed to only explain her position after 
rejecting practical presumption, and since she should not be allowed only to explain her view, 
she must be obliged to present (in addition) an argument.  
 
t1 P: Presumably, p. 
t2 O: Reject: “Presumably, p.” 
 
29 There are at least three reasons why “Presumably, John will be at the party” does not belong to the common 
ground. First, “John will be at the party” is certainly not a widely-accepted proposition supported by many 
epistemic sources (like “The Earth is round”). Second, “John will be at the party” is not a shared concession, i.e., 
the proposition accepted by Alice and Mark at the beginning of the dialogue. Third, even when we interpret this 
proposition in the pragmatic, action-oriented sense of “We should act as if John will be at the party,” Alice and 
Mark still do not accept it at the beginning of a dialogue. At best, they accept a (presumptive) rule “If it is uncertain 
whether John will be at the party, then we should act as if John will be at the party” and then, in turn t1, Mark 
derives presumption based on this rule and its antecedent (basic fact) “It is uncertain whether John will be at the 
party.” In summary, a practical presumption is not a common ground premise (that should be) accepted before the 
main discussion to enable a desirable start of the discussion. Rather, it is a provisional conclusion drawn at some 
later point of the discussion, to enable a desirable end of deliberation (i.e., avoiding greater harm in the context 
of evidential uncertainty and pressure to make a timely decision).   
30 That is, for all that Mark knows, Alice seems committed to both a presumptive rule and the basic fact in turn t2. 
Consequently, one would expect that she will not reject a presumption in t2. 
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t2+n O: Argumentative reason: a. [= discharging the BoA] 
 
Fig. 2 A profile of dialogue: practical presumption (strict view) 
 
According to a looser view, the burden of explanation also suffices when a challenged 
proposition is not part of the common ground. To be sure, the proponents will especially need 
guidance when the common ground propositions get rejected, but dialectical rules should also 
permit explanations when common ground is not at stake, and the discussion is already 
underway. In principle, offering strategic advice is a cooperative move under any 
circumstances, and the dialectical rules should not penalize the opponent for being “too 
cooperative.” They must allow explanations and strategic advice even when the opponent’s 
explanations and guidance are, perhaps, unnecessary.  
But how are practical presumptions, then, different from cognitive ones? If both types 
of presumptions allow explanations, as well as arguments, then, after they are rejected, all 
presumptions place the burden of reasoning (BoR) on their opponents. Do cognitive and 
practical presumptions, under the looser interpretation of the burden of explanation, have the 
same deontic function? I propose the following answer: In principle, they might, but, in 
concrete dialogical practice, they do (should) not. Even in the looser view, we can do justice to 
the differences between cognitive and practical presumptions: in principle, dialectical rules 
might permit the opponent to explain the rejection of a practical presumption but, unlike in the 
cognitive case, they should strongly encourage the opponent to provide an argument (due to 
the special circumstances of uncertainty and pressure). In the profile below, the suboptimal 
response is illustrated by a curved line. 
 
 
  
t1 P:    Presumably, p. 
t2 O:    Reject: “Presumably, p.” 
 
 
 
t2+n O: Argumentative reason: a.    O: Explanatory reason: e.  
[=discharging the BoA.]     [= discharging the BoE] 
 
 
Fig. 3 A profile of dialogue: practical presumption (looser view) 
 
What makes explanations suboptimal in practical cases? Why should rules, in the Party 
example, encourage Alice to support “We should go to the party” by argument rather than 
explanation (in some turn t2+n)? We mentioned one reason previously: since Alice does not 
reject a common-ground proposition, offering strategic advice to Mark seems unnecessary. The 
more important reasons, however, are related to the view that opponent’s explanations are 
usually irrelevant or even detrimental to the optimal resolution of deliberation. How is this 
possible?  
Let us remember that explanatory reasons are not aiming at persuasion and that, after 
rejecting a presumption in t2, Alice might say the following: “The tea leaves tell me that John 
will not come to the party.” Since Mark does not believe in reading tea leaves, her explanation 
is not persuasive, but it seems dialectically permissible. From a dialectical viewpoint, Alice 
does not commit any argumentative fallacy (since, technically, she does not provide an 
argument) and, more importantly, she is cooperative and transparent. She cooperates with Mark 
by presenting the evidence she considers relevant and, presumably, the only additional 
evidence she is capable of presenting at t2+n (offering, thereby, strategic advice). To see why 
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her explanation is permissible, but not dialectically optimal we must appreciate two 
deliberation limitations underlying the Party example: uncertainty and time pressure. Since 
Mark and Alice both wish to avoid greater harm (seeing John), they will attend the party only 
if they are sufficiently certain that John will skip it, and, by turn t2, they seem uncertain about 
John's whereabouts. Also, the time for gathering evidence about John’s whereabouts is limited: 
the train is about to leave, and Mark and Alice must decide quickly. 
I believe that Alice’s explanation is irrelevant because it cannot affect the uncertainty 
and, thereby, cannot change the default course of action.31 Namely, when the evidence is 
uncertain, practical presumptions produce a default course of action and, in the Party example, 
this action is skipping the party: if at the time when Mark and Alice must go to the train station, 
it remains (dialectically) uncertain whether John will come to the party, then Mark and Alice 
will skip the party. To take an alternative action, Mark and Alice must agree that it became 
sufficiently certain that John will skip the party. But since reading tea leaves will not persuade 
Mark, the proposition “John will skip the party” will remain dialectically uncertain, and the 
original presumption will remain in place. As a result, the proposed explanation does not affect 
the outcome of deliberation: Mark and Alice will skip the party, i.e., they will do what they 
would have done even if the explanation was not offered. So, why offer explanations, even if 
they are allowed? In the described circumstances, explaining seems pointless.32 
Not only is providing explanation irrelevant, but it is also detrimental. Practical 
presumptions arise when time is limited and, thereby, represents an especially valuable 
resource. In these special circumstances, it is usually not reasonable to spend time on giving 
(only) explanations since they, as we have seen, do not change the default outcome of 
deliberation. Given that parties want to optimize their chances to arrive at the best decision, 
which might be different form a default decision, they should spend the time in a more 
constructive way. The first, obvious choice is to present and discuss arguments if they are 
already at hand. If, in the turn t2+n, Alice has both an explanation and an argument up her sleeve, 
then she should present an argument. By doing so, Alice will have a better chance to persuade 
Mark, affect dialectical uncertainty, and move deliberation towards optimal resolution. The 
second, less obvious choice might be to spend time on finding arguments that are not already 
at hand. Suppose that in the turn t2+n, Alice has a choice: to provide an explanation, or to search 
for reasons that might be relevant for making the best decision. For instance, instead of 
spending time discussing tea leaves, Alice might call John and ask him about his whereabouts. 
If Mark and Alice consider John reliable, acquiring this information will have a direct impact 
on making an optimal decision in the Party example.33 
 
31 In the context of dialogue, certainty is understood in a dialectical sense: proposition p is certain if, among other 
things, both parties agree that it is (likely) true. Otherwise, it is treated as uncertain. Notice that this does not 
exclude objective epistemic considerations. I do not claim that mutual agreement that p is (likely) true is sufficient 
condition to render p dialectically certain; instead, I claim that it is a necessary condition to render p dialectically 
certain.    
32 But what happens if Mark uses the information about tea leaves to persuade Alice that John’s whereabouts are 
still uncertain? Does explanation, perhaps, affect the outcome of deliberation by giving strategic guidance to 
Mark? I believe that it does not. The presumption stays in place as long as Mark remains skeptical about the 
reliability of tea leaves and John’s whereabouts, and this does not seem to depend on whether his future attempt 
to persuade Alice, by exploiting her explanation concerning tea leaves, is successful or not.   
33 One may think that this renders a looser view implausible: since giving explanation is detrimental in these 
special circumstances, it should not be permitted. But one should acknowledge that, at least sometimes, 
explanations can be persuasive to a limited degree and, in a way, represent weak arguments. In other words, that 
the proponent does not accept the opponent’s explanatory reason could mean that she finds this reason acceptable 
to a very small degree. However, in situations of uncertainty, where any piece of evidence might be relevant to 
arrive at the best decision, these explanations might not be entirely detrimental and could be relevant to some 
limited extent. I believe that, as far as rejections of practical presumptions are concerned, explanations should be 
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To sum up, usually, when the opponent rejects a practical presumption, presenting an 
explanation is not only irrelevant but also, literally, a waste of time. Since time is a limited 
resource, explaining might come with the high opportunity cost and, thereby, be detrimental to 
the optimal resolution of the decision-making process. Nothing similar appears to happen when 
the opponent rejects cognitive presumption. As a result, two types of presumptions have 
distinct deontic functions.  
 
THE DEONTIC FUNCTION OF COGNITIVE PRESUMPTION: After they are rejected, cognitive 
presumptions allocate the burden of reasoning (BoR)—i.e., either the burden of arguing 
(BoA) or the burden of explanation (BoE)—on the opponent’s side.   
 
THE DEONTIC FUNCTION OF PRACTICAL PRESUMPTION: After they are rejected, cognitive 
presumptions, in principle, allocate the burden of reasoning (BoR)—i.e., either the 
burden of arguing (BoA) or the burden of explanation (BoE)—on the opponent’s side. 
However, in practice, they should usually allocate only the burden of arguing (BoA). 
 
Admittedly, these characterizations are not complete. First of all, they deal only with 
the opponent’s obligations. But what about the proponent obligations? Is the proponent 
exempted from the burden of proof? And if she is, then in which sense of the term? 
Furthermore, the characterization does not tell us anything about the conditionality of the 
opponent’s obligation. Is the opponent immediately obliged to give reasons, or does this 
obligation depend on the proponent’s request for reasons? And who gets to choose whether 
argumentative or explanatory reasons must be presented: the proponent or the opponent? 
Finally, the crucial notion of “asymmetrical allocation” has not been explored at all.  
Nevertheless, even at the preliminary stage, our results show that standard accounts of 
presumption require qualifications. If we accept the natural conception of the burden of proof 
(in the sense of the burden of arguing), then presumptions do not asymmetrically allocate the 
burden of proof. Also, cognitive and practical presumptions might have distinct deontic 
functions. Although they both place the burden of reasoning on the opponent, practical 
presumptions either require (stricter view) or strongly recommend arguments (looser view). 
Since this is not the case with cognitive presumptions, they potentially create different patterns 
of dialectical interaction.          
 
5. Conclusion 
 
According to standard accounts, presumptions are dialectically privileged, yet defeasible, 
propositions: if the opponent rejects a presumption, she is supposed to carry the burden of 
proof, and the presumption is acceptable until the burden of proof is (successfully) discharged. 
Standard accounts acknowledge that there are various types of presumptions, but they treat the 
deontic function as a shared dialectical feature or some sort of common denominator. Put 
simply, once rejected, all presumptions are supposed to place the burden of proof on the 
opponents.  
 In this paper, I analysed the deontic function by taking into account (1) different types 
of presumption, and (2) distinct conceptions of the burden of proof. First, I argued that 
presumption, taken in the abstract sense, does not place the burden of proof on the opponent, 
but rather the burden of reasoning. This conclusion is not entirely in line with the standard 
accounts since the burden of proof is, typically, a narrower conception than the burden of 
 
permitted but not recommended since, at least sometimes, they might contribute to something more than providing 
a strategic guidance.  
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reasoning. Second, I argued that, at a less abstract level, cognitive and practical presumptions 
distribute different dialectical obligations. To be sure, they both place the burden of reasoning 
on the opponent, but whereas cognitive presumptions require either arguments or explanations, 
practical presumptions seem to require arguments. Thus, at the level of a concrete dialogical 
implementation, the deontic analogy (deontic uniqueness), proposed by standard accounts, 
does not hold. Presumptions have distinct deontic functions. 
 The results of this paper are relevant for the argumentation theory, in particular, and 
philosophy, in general. In argumentation theory, for instance, they contribute to the normative 
study of the opponent’s critical reactions (see Krabbe and van Laar 2011; van Laar and Krabbe 
2013). In philosophy, they contribute to the ongoing discussion between dialectical 
foundationalists and dialectical egalitarianists (see Leite 2005; Rescorla 2009a, 2009b). For 
obvious reasons, they add to the dialectical study of presumptions. Nevertheless, the present 
results are provisional, and much additional work is needed to test their tenability.       
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